[ CLICK to view WEB site]

Register and get this Rescue News Letter for free - just click and send  [ Add my e-mail address to your list ]

Dear Reader - As we enter 2009 we continue with our serialisation of extrication evolutions 'MPV - Roof fold Down', 'Firefighter Protocols for Life Threatening Situations' and Fatal Crashes - Truck V's Car'. As we leave 2008 it is with deep concern that in this issue we highlight firefighter fatalities and the increase in firefighter mortality and injury here at home in the UK. The lack of recognition for death due to Firefighter instruction based on age old practice and inadequate information gathering, poor training facilities and on-duty health related issues, must now be addressed. Over the last 40 years I have never known it any different and it continues to be a scar on the face of the British fire service and an indictment of scurrilous management flaunting in the face of health and safety legislation. However, to be fair, the UK fire service is well ahead of their American counterparts as Distress Signaling Units and SCBA entry boards {Passport System), guidelines (search and tag lines) and emergency teams (Rapid Intervention Teams) have been in place for literally half a century  - Stay Safe out there!  I, Len Watson editor -  [ FEEDBACK ] - 

Firefighter Protocols for Life Threatening Situations .../....

Extrication Evolution for Dual IC and SIPS 

In the previous installment I asked readers to familiarise themselves with our Document for discussion - 'SRS smart systems Logic' - [CLICK]. This study document will enable the reader to fully recognise the risks involved and equate the SIPS configuration to the extrication evolution necessary to risk assess 'roof fold down' on MPV's.

To re-appraise yourself as to the crash detail and scenario for this paper exercise, I would ask the reader to revisit ISSUE 21 and refresh your memory.

On Approach - The MPV vehicle on-its-side

The outer circle survey should begin on the approach to the crash and the inner zone as we walk around the vehicle. The order of risk mitigation will depend on how volatile it’s nature and the situation its presented in. For the purpose of this paper there are no surrounding risks and the only hazard that needs addressing is the vehicle itself. The following offers a good starting point –

Enforce the Following Risk Control Measures (RCM) - 

• Stabilise the vehicle prior to entry.
• On entering vehicle, do not place your body-weight on side window glass.
• Where possible, wind-down all window glass on upper- most side of the vehicle.
• Switch ignition off. Hand key/transponder to the IC.
• Where possible, disconnect battery (The battery may be located in the trunk/boot/luggage compartment).

• Where an airbag has deployed, inspect all SIPS to determine which remain live and identify mechanical systems.

New technology risks identified –

• Electronically activated duel air curtains
• Mechanical pretensioners fitted to each seating position
• Keyless go
• Battery inaccessible for disconnection

RESCUE WITH LIVE/UNDEPLOYED SYSTEMS - (Unable to disconnect battery supply)

• Ensure ignition is switched off - key/transponder removed.
• DO NOT place hard protection between SIPS deployment paths and the casualty.
• When disconnecting, cutting, spreading or crushing in the area of SIPS components or wiring, enforce the 20 and 6 inch rule (500 and 150 mm rule)
• DO NOT cut IC cylinders or pyrotechnic units.
• Cover all jagged/protruding roof pillars and posts.

Extrication EVOLUTION - Roof Fold-Down with IC - Working with live IC/SIP systems

Click on image to view SRS Key

The method for Roof Fold Down outlined below highlight the critical areas of risk and the options to control or reduce risk. Hard and soft protection must only be used when and where it is safe to do so.

• Perform glass management as necessary and remove hatchback at the hinges – BE AWARE that some liftgates are fitted with high pressure gas struts and the liftgate will eject open as the weight distribution will have altered with the vehicle on-its-side.
• PRY BEFORE YOU CUT.  Strip the interior trim from all roof pillars and posts and expose the metal channel. Inspect all installation slots for IC and pretensioner inclusion. Pinpoint the exact location of cylinders, connectors and system wiring, and inspect the centre pillar for pretensioner inclusion.
• Remove casualty/ies seatbelt  and pass all webbing and tongues onto the AIO - Accident Investigating Officer.
• Cut and remove all webbing to the uppermost roof pillars.

Roof Fold Down – with undeployed IC/SIPS - Order of cutting

• Give an audible warning and cut the uppermost windscreen pillar as close to the roof structure as practicable. Ensure the air curtain has been completely cut through

• Give an audible warning and cut the uppermost rear of the roof’s side channel but avoid the pyrotechnic unit. Ensure the air curtain has been completely cut through
• Give an audible warning, cut uppermost centre door pillar avoiding seat belt anchorage plate
• Where fitted avoid the seat belt anchorage plate; give an audible warning, carefully support the remainder of the sliding door window frame, and cut uppermost rear door pillar
• Conduct relief cuts to front and rear header channel as indicated in diagram.

• Ensure seatbelts are completely cut and carefully fold the roof's structure down to the ground.

*RISK - Liberation of window housings and sharp edges to laminated glass and roof pillars.  Possible deployment of rear IC due to cutting/crushing of the pyrotechnic unit.

CAUTION - RISK CRITICAL - In order to 'Fold Down' the roof structure - before cutting the roof's rear roof structure -

• DO NOT place hard protection between undeployed IC when cutting the rear roof structure
• Ensure all seatbelt webbing has been completely removed from the casualty and is cut away on the upper-most side of the vehicle
• DO NOT cut the rear IC pyrotechnic module – Crushing/cutting the module can deploy the rear air curtain and release hot residue through the completed part of the cut.

REMEMBER -  When performing the above options, where appropriate, always enforce the (20 and 6 inch rule (500 and 150 mm rule).

• Left and right SIPS have separate sensors. To accidentally deploy the pyrotechnic unit will only deploy the rear upper-most module
• To disconnect/cut SIPS wiring will only disarm the module in question and WILL NOT disarm the system. To detonate the pyrotechnic unit will still deploy the air curtain
• DO NOT disconnect direct from the SIP module, as this connection is not equipped with a fail-safe.

Liberation of pyrotechnic -

The most likely incident of pyrotechnic spillage can be experienced where the cut to the rear roof section is performed. Sodium Nitrate may detonate otherwise it will present a serious hazard. Instigate and observe safety procedures in force within your department.

Before you leave scene - Commitment to care

• Hand over the responsibility for 'duty of care'. On completion of the extrication, preserve the accident scene, place warning signs or pass 'DUTY OF CARE' on to the Police/Recovery agent
• Prevent/reduce cross-contamination with blood and body fluids - use a super absorbent and a high integrity biocide
• Prevent needle stick injury - clear the vehicle of sharps

PAD - Post Accident Deployment -

To be continued - In the next ISSUE of the RESCUE news Letter we will discuss the risk assessment,  control measures and the extrication detail alongside critical risk information for the MPV with a different configuration of SRS that makes 'Roof Fold Down' much more complicated.

Fight for life - Did this little girl die in vain?

As difficult as it was to accept her loss, each found meaning in her death. “The little girl did not die in vain,” said Olshwanger, who said he still receives requests for copies of the photo. “To me, she is a hero because people are going out and buying smoke detectors because of what they see in that photo.”

FURTHER RESEARCH

Useful Links:

Lessons from London's Kings Cross Fire - Seconds From Disaster -

In terms of firefighting safety the UK fire service is well ahead of their American counterparts.  Distress Signaling Units and SCBA entry boards {Passport System), guidelines (search and tag lines) and emergency teams (Rapid Intervention Teams) have been in place for literally half a century. However it is refreshing to see how US firefighters are getting on with re-inventing the wheel. Don't get me wrong, I am a firm believer that these wheels need re-inventing, especially when they have been in place for a long time.

1959 - Introduction of BA entry control and procedures in the UK fire service 

Following a fatal fire in London's Smithfields meat market in 1958, much of the fire underground at basement level, two firefighters, Station Officer Jack Fort-Wells and Firefighter Dick Stocking, lost their lives when they became lost in smoke and were not missed by colleagues until it was to late to mount a rescue attempt - read history of Smithfield fire [CLICK] 

As a result of this incident, many valuable lessons were learnt. A tally system was introduced for each breathing apparatus set which meant that a record was kept whenever a set was worn. A purpose designed control board was used to enter the tallies and write vital information on; the firefighter's name, time he entered the building, wearer's location and the amount of oxygen the Proto BA set contained. From this information the entry board's controller entered an expected duration time and time of exit. In the event of an emergency, the controller would now be able to inform emergency crews where to locate overdue firefighters. This became the basis of all BA control procedures still followed throughout the UK and many Commonwealth Fire Services.

Unfortunately these procedures, although they have been in practice for many years and to a degree served their purpose over time, they  no longer address the real issues that threaten firefighters at larger fires. 

Hays Business Centre, Gillender Street, East London 1991 - Guide-lines / search lines

One particular fire springs to mind The Hays Business Centre, Gillender Street, East London 10th July1991, where two firefighters, Terry Hunt and David Stokoe, lost their lives.. I followed the incident with great interest through the Coroner's Court, where a verdict of 'unlawfull killing' was returned and a H & S improvement notice, which resulted in the subsequent rewriting of guideline procedures.

I attended the fire as one of the five crew members of one of London's Emergency Rescue Tenders (Dedicated Rescue Vehicle). Our team was responsible for extinguishing the fire with two lines of 45mm (1 3/4 inch) hose. Although it was a relatively small fire, one that beggared belief that it took the lives of two firefighters who became disorientated and lost in smoke, the building design resulted in it heating up like an oven.

The warehouse was an old large 5 storey building that had been reconstructed internally, where metal mezzanine metal floors had been installed to increase floor space; in effect making the building seven floors. The premises was used as secure storage to archive bank and accountancy records, mostly paper in cardboard boxes and micro-fish files.

All the windows in the building had been removed and glass-blocks cemented in place offering no natural ventilation to the premises. 

The first in crews were lured into a false sense of security as there was no smoke seen to be issuing outside the building. They entered the premises to investigate what could have been taken as a false alarm or a very small fire. On investigation they discovered the fire to be contained within a compartment. Being a large complex building, even with the fire alarm panel indicating the approximate area of fire, it took time to pin point the search, which ultimately delayed the initial attack on the fire.

Smoke logging was apparent on the second floor mezzanine, but by the time many lengths of hose were stretched from the second floor dry-rising main, up the stairs to the second floor mezzanine, along a wire caged corridor; at which point an adaptor was added with a length of hose reel tubing (small bore hose), water was then laid on and  an SCBA team entered the fire compartment area but by this time the actual fire could not be located. Heat and humidity got the better of them, so they withdrew.

As the smoke logging and heat increased a 70mm (2 1/2 inch) hose line was laid from the street (due to the dry rising main leaking) to the entrance of the fire compartment but was never charged with water as smoke logging overtook the fire crew.

The fire area was enclosed within brick walls, a concrete ceiling and metal flooring. Its area at that time was unknown. A make 'Pumps' 15 (15 fire trucks) was initiated and two further attacks were initialised at different points to fight the fire. Later, as the fire progressed,  'pumps' were made 20.

In the meantime, due to the intensity of smoke logging, it was decided that a 4 firefighter SCBA crew would lay a main guide-line (Search line) from the ground floor entry point to the fire compartment area. The guide-line became snagged in its bag so it was tied off and a second line was then used to extend it.

The SCBA crew's interface radio ceased to function but relying on the crew leader's personal hand-held radio, he decided to continue.

A second SCBA team was then ordered to follow the initial guide-line and lay a branch line off to search the remainder of the 2nd floor mezzanine. The first team were never informed of this action.

Due to severe smoke and heat and the inbred fear of flash-over, the second team became disorientated and mistakenly lay the branch line back on itself along the other side of the 2 metre (6 foot) wide corridor, back to the staircase at the entrance to the second floor mezzanine. Realising they had looped the line, they had the presence of mind to verify with entry control that this was the only staircase in this sector. They then exited the building. Aware of what they had done they reported it to entry control but the message was never relayed to the first team.

On completion of their task the first team were retracing their way along the main guide-line where they discovered that the bag at the tie off point (where they had extended the main guide-line from) had come adrift and had spewed out the remainder of its contents on the floor.

Suffering from the effects of severe heat and exhaustion, disorientated they followed the line; only to find that they had retraced their steps to the fire compartment. Again they made their way back along the guide-line to the bag tie off point where a disagreement broke out as each were convinced they knew the way out. Not thinking clearly the crew of 4 split into groups of two and went separate ways,

At this point a vital message was sent, "We are lost on the main guide line - We have come to the branch guide line and whistles are going - Running low on air - Get CA men in", failed to trigger the correct response. Time was lost trying to contact the Incident Commander before the first Emergency Team (RIT) was committed.

Just in the nick of time the emergency team found two of the guide-line team at the entrance to the 2nd floor mezzanine by the staircase. The team leader had just run out of air and was struggling to breath as they emerged at entry control. 

It was quite some time later when the other two were located and their bodies recovered. They had both run out of air and had removed their facemasks. The inside of the masks were sticky with oily deposits from the smoke and carbon deposits were later identified in their mouths and lungs.

Their rescue was fraught with difficulty highlighting areas that had never been considered before. They became tangled up in the guide line, branch line and hose lines, and the corners in the corridors only added to their problems. 

First their SCBA sets became entangled and displaced, which made it necessary to remove them: then their turn-out coats slipped from their lifeless bodies as they were dragged along the corridors and down the stairs. The humidity could be likened to a steam bath. Please consider how hot it was. The heat was so intense that spalling  to the concrete on the ceiling and supporting pillars was later very evident. During the time the fire was being fought and scalding condensed steam, which had nowhere to vent, was raining from the ceiling - no one could stand for long for fear of cooking, so the recovery of the two firefighters from the 2nd floor mezzanine had to be done on hands and knees.

All these issues and the inherent dangers that can be associated with guide-lines have, to date, been overlooked. To meet the requirements of the H&S improvement notice, Operational Note 91 for guide-line procedure, was rewritten. Ostensibly it remained the same, no major changes were made but in the end everyone was satisfied; and that was the end of that!

To this day the obvious areas that needed addressing continue to remain unanswered e.g.

None of the guide-line crew activated their distress signaling units (DSU).  Interestingly the Pathologist report noted that both firefighters' brains had swollen and were cherry red. Had this anything to do with the SCBA guide-line team's decision not to call for help sooner or activate their DSU's or is there some other underlining reason? Even the new automatic distress signaling unit (ADSU) that came about after this incident, fails to address the reluctance of manually sounding the personal alarm. Of course in a building as large as Hays Building Services, who could possibly have head them from outside.

That was 17 years ago and the discussion and research still goes on. In 2002 the UK Fire Experimental Unit (FEU) were given the task of looking at better methods or ways of improving upon guide-lines. The study took them more than two years to complete and the end result concluded that the current guideline being `light, cheap and easily replaced' still offered the best solution.

O come on, get real - think outside the box !  New search equipment and procedures are long overdue.

What trials, if any, have been conducted with the following? -

• electroluminescent lighting strips and wires, way guidance systems and photoluminescence - There is a vast array of systems and products that could be adopted. I am sure there are many innovative manufacturers that would love to be approached to develop an electronic solution - Consider - Escape lighting on the floor is mandatory for aircrafts. 
• LASER light orientation - The strategic positioning or colour laser lights would offer immediate assistance to firefighter orientation. They could be fixed by pump suctioned to any wall or zip tied to suitable caging or structures. As opposed to guide-lines, they could be positioned at the same level throughout and not obstruct doorways or tie up doors or other openings.
• Directional sound orientation - Intermittent sound is easily traceable and could be used in conjunction with directional laser. As a team committed to rescue we often used directional sound (The attention beep on a loud-hailer) to orientate our emergency team when training and it always worked extremely well.
• Parabolic microphone locator - A parabolic microphone could be used in smoke to locate and guide firefighters to missing persons.
• Thermal imagery for search teams -

Specialist training for emergency crews (RIT)

Who should make up a rapid intervention team? How many firefighters should the team consist of? What training should be given and who should commit them? All valid questions, ones that presumable have been considered and answered long ago.

In dealing with my second firefighter death at a ship fire way back in January 1980, I remember arriving on deck and finding nothing being done to rescue a missing firefighter. The appointed emergency team consisting of two recently appointed firefighters with less than one year's experience between them They were standing-by at entry control and fortunately had not been committed. The incident commander had lost the plot and insisted that it was too dangerous to attempt a rescue. 

Our ERT crew successfully carried out the rescue but unfortunately the firefighter was dead on recovery. The point here is two fold. 1.) The appointed 2 firefighter emergency team was hopelessly overwhelmed and 2.) the incident commander was too inexperienced to risk-assess and manage the situation accordingly.

In the early part of my career it was normal for the ERT crew to form the emergency crew. The two inner London ERT's had a minimum of seven firefighters in the crew and the three outer London ERT's had five in each ream. The ruling was that these crews always worked as a team and were never split or reduced in number. These specialist vehicles attended all the larger fires and gained valuable experience and 'know how.'  Over the years it became very obvious to me that ERT's were resented as they were perceived to steal the thunder from front line firefighters and officers. 

After the RudiM ship fire enquiry, our ERT crew were given 'Notes for file' (a reprimand), obviously to discourage us from disobeying a direct order. Some time after I was handed a confidential document which stated ERT crews has become a danger to themselves and were no longer necessary as all pumps carried a full rider position of SCBA. After that ERT's attendance were put on a request only basis for fires. With the exception of Gillender Street, we were never requested from there in. 

It took eight years and it was only after the enquiry into the Kings Cross fire in the London Underground in 1987, which took the lives of 31 people including a firefighter, that new rescue vehicles arrived. Now called Fire Rescue Units (FRU) they replaced the ERT's, and we were re-instated on all ship, basement and fires requiring 8 pumps and above. But by now, through lack of use and new team members who replaced those who had left or retired, the experience had been watered down 

Where would the fire service be without experience? 

The importance of training is obvious and a H&S mandatory requirement. So that we can grasp my point here we should appreciate that experience is not a requirement. With this highlighted in our minds we need to realise that the firefighting profession is different to say a plumber, electrician, builder etc., in so much as in these professions their skill level can be wholly imparted to them. A firefighter can only be instructed and trained in the basic rudimentary. Only operational experience and the inheritance gained from teamwork with the operationally blooded, educates the firefighter in recognising risk, risk analysis, how much you can push into a fire and what is safe and not safe. Although an imperfect science it's, never the less, the only way the firefighter can gain experience. However, one other thing qualifies all of this, the actual experience itself; and only then where good practice can be identified and bad practice corrected.

In the Next issue - 

We will continue with entry control, guide line procedures and search line survival training; and discuss the estimation and potential of risks when searching in, around and above the fire.

Addressing The `Truck V’s Car problem'  Truck Cab Fender Design

The positioning of the truck’s engine, whether it’s in front of the cab or cab over engine design has little bearing in the truck v’s car stakes. Ground clearance differential is the all important factor and the carnage cries out for a radical change in truck design.

Superficial design changes only delay the inevitable and have cost many lives in the false process of an ineffectual design culture. What makes this worse is that truck manufacturers’ knew that their designs would not alter the status quo but were quite happy to sleep at night and allow the carnage to continue. There must be something seriously and fundamentally wrong with our Department Of Transport to allow this to continue year on year.

Polypropylene bumpers with expanded polyurethane foam padding do nothing except act as a sled to assist the truck to ride up the car.

We have already discussed Volvo Truck’s new and innovative safety design for front under-run protection. They heavily promote their concept but, as yet keep their test results under wraps. However their initiative will lead the way and persuade other manufactures to follow. Lets hope that Volvo introduces it quickly to its full range of trucks and its subsidiary Renault Trucks.

The future offers many more ways to address the problems associated with ‘truck v’s car’ crashes.  The motor industry, Department Of Transport, Highway/Freeway agencies and insurance companies all have a role to play.

for example –

• Make the fitting of side and rear under-ride barriers and water filled cushions on trucks compulsory

• Lane discipline - make trucks keep in lane and offer lane change support only where necessary e.g. crawler lanes, pull over lanes for the slower commercial vehicle.

• Merging traffic – Make driving tests ensure competency to match speeds before attempting to merge with faster moving traffic

• Where appropriate install centre barriers to prevent cross-over into oncoming traffic

• Make it compulsory to give way to merging traffic.

• Make it compulsory for merging traffic to match speed when merging

• Enforce a strict culture of lane discipline

• Intelligent roads and warning systems

• Speed cameras to measure average speed only

• Install electronic speed inhibitors on bends

• Lane change intelligent warning system

• Speed differential indicator: Ahead/behind

• Safe distance between vehicles indicator

• Automatic hard-braking when collision is inevitable

• Black boxes that record vehicle movement and data

Some of these initiatives are already in the planning stage or have already been undertaken by the more progressive motor manufacturers and this will help drive the industry forward to making the roads a safer place. However some innovation is dependant on Government, Department Of Transport and Highways/Freeway Agencies.

The trail of destruction and recovery

In the meantime the trail of destruction and recovery will continue. No matter how fast new measures are introduced, a long term legacy, particularly in the emerging nations and third world countries, of truck v’ car disparities will remain. As their economies grow and their road networks expand and transport volume increases, we are already witnessing the massive and needless scourge on their roads. Tens of thousands of crashes of this nature happen every year around the globe and a vast array of photographic evidence is available. This is particularly underlined in their bus and coach crashes for example –

Germany - Fatal Bus Fire

An inferno has killed 20 people and injured 12 others, most of them elderly, aboard a coach on a motorway near Hanover in northern Germany - Read more, watch video [ CLICK ] Photo gallery - [ CLICK ]

 11 die in bus disaster
Independent Online - Cape Town,South Africa
Eleven people have been reported dead as a result of this accident," Cele expressed outrage at yet another accident involving a luxury bus on a KZN road. ...
See all stories on this topic

25 Russian Tourists Killed in Bus Accident Near Eilat, Israel
Twenty-five people were killed in the accident and over 30 were injured. (Meital Yasur-Beit Or) Eyewitness to Eilat crash: Driver was speeding recklessly as he veered off road By Haaretz Service and The Associated Press Fatal bus crash: ...
The News is NowPublic.com - World:

Express bus crashes into tree and overturns near Tangkak, killing 10
Malaysia Star - Malaysia
Transport Minister Datuk Seri Ong Tee Keat said an investigation would be carried out and if negligence was found to be the cause of the accident, ... See all stories on this topic

Death toll rises to 21 in NW China highway accident
People's Daily Online - Beijing,China
The accident happened around 8:30 am when a coal truck and a bus collided head-on while traveling on National Highway 314. ... See all stories on this topic

17 killed in Khairpur road mishap
Online - International News Network - Islamabad,Pakistan
According to SHO Hangorja, the accident occurred near Ranipur when a passenger coach coming from Karachi and heading to Punjab, tried to overtake another ... See all stories on this topic

New Products

New SCBA - Federal Contract Gives IAFF Lead in Developing Lighter Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus - 

The Department of Homeland Security has awarded the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) a $2 million contract to develop a new smaller, lighter SCBA that will improve fire fighter safety and make the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) worn by first responders substantially thinner and lighter - more info [ CLICK ]

EXO Personal Escape System

In 2005 NYFD began to investigate and research a personal self rescue system for firefighters. In their search they conducted a comprehensive study of existing personal safety systems. Then approached Petzl to develop a system that would meet their performance criteria and Petzl developed the EXO Personal Escape system - read more [ CLICK ] 

NEWS & VIEWS

JEDDAH: Firefighter Killed After Falling from a High-Rise

A firefighter died after falling from a high-rise building under construction in Jeddah during a drill yesterday morning - read more - [ CLICK ]

Firefighters' risks go beyond flames, smoke 
Green Bay Press Gazette - Green Bay,WI,USA
It was the leading cause of death in 2007 claiming 52 of the 118 lives lost, said the report "US Fire Administration Firefighter Fatalities in 2007 - [ CLICK ]

Inquiry finds dead firemen badly equipped - 

An investigation into the deaths of two firemen during a blaze at a disused factory in Co Wicklow, Ireland last year has found that they did not have access to proper equipment, training and resources - read more - [ CLICK ]

UK - Fire Brigade Union - Firefighter deaths increasing when they should be reducing

The past five years have seen the worst figures for twenty years for all operational deaths among UK firefighters.  Fire Brigades Union general secretary Matt Wrack has stated - Yet "We have better fire engines, we have better equipment, including personal protective equipment. We have a better understanding of many of the risks we face. In theory at least we have better operational procedures. We should therefore have seen a decline in serious and fatal accidents and we should have been able to maintain that."

In his published document he highlights many things that are wrong, that need addressing and states - "there are problems in relation to record keeping. The official records are a patchwork. The research looked back over thirty years. We can conclude that there is under-recording of the number of deaths. There has been little or no analysis of trends."
- Read the full report [ CLICK ] 

Growing Scandal of Firefighter Deaths - A new report commissioned by the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) has revealed a scandalous rise in the number of firefighters dying on duty - read more - [ CLICK ]

The United States Fire Administration Announces the 2007 Firefighter Fatalities Report

"One of the greatest challenges we face as a fire service is to stop the needless deaths of firefighters while serving their communities," United States Fire Administrator Greg Cade said. "Every day and across this nation, firefighters are responding to emergencies that threaten the lives of their residents. These same threats also threaten the lives of firefighters. Unfortunately, we all lost far too many firefighters in 2007."

During calendar year 2007, there were 118 firefighters who lost their lives while on duty across the United States - read a breakdown of the report - [ CLICK ]

USA Firefighter Health and Safety - Links of interest  - read more - [ CLICK ]

Major Year for Natural Disasters

The world's biggest re-insurance companies has said that the past year has been one of the most devastating ever in terms of natural disasters. Munich Re said the impact of the disasters was greater than in 2007 in both human and economic terms - read more - [ CLICK ]

Nissan Frontier Pathfinder Xterra Airbag Sensor Recall
If this happens, the red air bag warning light will illuminate to alert the vehicle operator. This issue could result in the non-deployment of the driver and passenger front air bags in a crash, increasing the risk of personal injury. ...
Truck Accessory Guide - http://truckaccessoryguide.com/

Chlling Audiotapes Released 4 Years After Fatal Fire
MSNBC - USA
New audiotapes released Monday exhibit the desperation the firefighters felt moments before their death. "She created a death trap," said Assistant Bronx ...
See all stories on this topic

www.resqmed.com/DailyNewsSheet.htm

New eBooks - Crash Rescue - 'Vehicle entrapment rescue and pre-hospital trauma care' is the first book of its kind to interact the disciplines of technical and medical rescue.  Know more about 'best practice' for in-vehicle resuscitation and patient management and learn what the paramedic can reasonably expect from their attending fire department. And RTC extrication RESCUE - The most advanced manual available today.  An up to the minute technical production for Vehicle Entrapment Extrication that offers risk assessed evolutions, safety measures and alternative options that cater for the very real world of rescue - For more information click on banner image under -

Visit resQmed's Study Program - Its INFORMED and FREE and we are offering its benefits to you in the hope of encouraging you to participate in, what we believe to be, a very worthwhile platform for sharing information and keeping abreast all the new developments in rescue.  To access, click this link 

  www.resqmed.com/Study.htm